UNCLOS

Piracy: Situating an Ancient Pursuit in a Modern World

Introduction

We are familiar with the outlines of the films: swashbuckling individuals bedecked in flouncy clothing sail the seas, seizing vessels, cargo and crew. The visions conjured up are like infamous pirates such as Edward Teach (Captain Blackbeard),[1]Anne Bonny,[2] or François Le Clerc (Jambe de Bois).[3] Modern piracy is conducted by different actors and a decentralised and pragmatic approach can provide a legal lodestar for tackling piracy in the global ocean.

Towards a Reference Point

Initially, piracy was primarily addressed through inter-state dialogue and treaties between states. For instance, the 1670 Treaty of Madrid between Spain and Great Britain bound the parties from plundering their respective vessels at sea.[4] The 1797 treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by the United States and the Bey of Tunis (then part of the Ottoman Empire)[5] protected the respective states’ cargo and vessels on the high seas even in war.[6]

Whilst bilateral treaties (between 2 states) lie at the heart of international relations and are a source of international law, multilateral treaties (between many states) go further in establishing generalised rules upon which majority of states can rely.  The leading authority, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),[7] defines piracy as an illegal act of violence, detention or depredation committed by passengers or crew of a private ship (or aircraft) for private ends on the high seas against another ship (or aircraft).[8]

Clarifying Differences

Not all piratical conduct by a ship against another are considered piracy. Piracy and armed robbery at sea are different because the maritime domain is demarcated into zones with varying levels of rights and obligations for coastal and flag states. The maritime zone of the crime determines who (i.e., the state) can assume responsibility to interdict, arrest and detain.

In the absence of this distinction in UNCLOS, resolution A.1025 (26) of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted on 2 December 2009, defines armed robbery against ships as any illegal act of violence, detention or act of depredation committed by passengers or crew of a private ship for private ends within a state’s internal waters, territorial waters, archipelagic waters.[9]

The high seas fall outside the jurisdiction of any state so all states’ warships or vessels have the right to seize a pirate ship, arrest pirates, seize the cargo on board the pirate ship and the court of the seizing state can try and punish the pirates.[10] In territorial waters or archipelagic waters, the coastal/archipelagic state normally has the responsibility to enforce its laws.[11]

Location is critical in assigning and assuming responsibilities

Highlighting Impact and Complexities

Piracy impacts trade supplies and livelihoods as open and safe seas become more of an aspiration. Closures or rerouting of shipping routes leads to supply shortages and price increases further impacting human cost of living.

In 2023, 120 actual and attempted incidents involving piracy and armed robbery at sea have been reported.[12] In January 2024, a total of 15 incidents were declared and recorded as piracy and armed robbery in international waters and straits used for international navigation.[13]There are fears that piracy will increase in the Gulf of Aden, which used to be a hotbed for piracy[14] as companies consider pausing operations to and from the Suez Canal to protect seafarers and vessels.[15]

Casting piracy in the wider approach of maritime security is necessary

Real world differences linked to international politics are highlighted in practically applying the current rules on piracy. This is because the elements of “who” (private entity), and “why” (private ends), whilst vital in identifying and tackling piracy, are complex to define.

When we consider that many shipping routes are strategically vital and also linked to the movement of key commodities, it is not always clear whether piracy is state sponsored, political or entirely private. This was observed with Somalia where pirates operate as part of “criminal networks whose leadership is unaffected by arrest and prosecutions of pirates who conducted the operations.”[16] Private ends can be political as they can go beyond financial enrichment to include acts with environmental goals.[17] It is argued that private acts should lack authorisation by public authority[18] but it is not clear how this is defined and identified.

Furthermore, not all states have the capability to interdict, detain, try and incarcerate suspected pirates and maritime armed robbers. This is why Somalia relies on the continued support of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS),[19] African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS),[20] and voluntary contributions by member states of the European Union (EU), the UK, South Korea, India and China.[21] States such as Seychelles have organised agreements with the EU on the conditions and modalities for dealing with suspected pirates.[22]

Lack of capacity does not mean lack of will

Adapting to Change

Shipping and threats to shipping are also changing. With the launch of the autonomous ship, MV Yara Birkeland,[23] it is a matter of time before autonomous shipping vessels cease to be novelties. However, new technologies are yet to be addressed in multilateral treaties.  For instance, unmanned vessels, controlled remotely or pre-programmed to hit a target, can engage in piratical conduct. Breaching the cyber defences of a ship or causing the destruction of a vessel can be piratical conduct. These present difficulties in interpreting and applying existing rules on piracy.

The International Law Commissions (ILC) is now considering a redefinition of piracy by linking it to armed robbery at sea (which is missing in UNCLOS).[24]  The ILC also notes that unmanned vessels and maritime autonomous vessels are subject to current rules on piracy.[25] This is a necessary first step towards establishing good governance mechanisms tackling modern piracy.

There are notable instances of states working together to share best practices, capacity and capabilities on a regional basis.[26] These initiatives cast piracy in the wider role of maritime security which, if developed further, with time bound targets for action, can align governance measures in tackling piracy and armed robbery at sea.

Conclusion

It would be easy to suggest that global organisations are slow to respond, yet it is high time that regional bodies take accountability, responsibility and action for tackling piracy in their back yards.

TLDR;

Piracy isn’t how we imagine it, it has changed. It’s high tech, evolving quickly and laws don’t keep up. I suggest we need time-boxed, agile rules that can keep up. Instead of waiting for global organisations to act we need smaller regional actors to step up.

 


[1] See  https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p07n8syy In this podcast, the life and crimes of the Captain Blackbeard are discussed.

[2] See information from the Royal Museums Greenwich (I recommend a visit if you can) about female pirates, Anne Bonny and Mary Read https://www.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/rmgc-object-157040

[3] See La Roncière, 1899, Histoire de la Marine Française Vol.4. Paris Libraire Plon. Pg. 40. Available here https://archive.org/details/histoiredelamari04larouoft/page/40/mode/2up

[4]See Art III of the Treaty for the Composing of Differences, Restraining of Depredations and Establishing of Peace in America between the Crowns of Great Britain and Spain signed 8 July 1670 (also known as the Madrid Treaty). Available here, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A32671.0001.001/1:2?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

[5] See The Barbary Treaties 1786-1816 or 1797 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Available here,  https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bar1797t.asp

[6] Ibid. Art. 3.

[7] See https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

[8] UNCLOS Art. 101.

[9] See Annex Para. 2.2. Available here, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/A%2026-Res.1025%20-%20Adopted%20on%202%20December%202009%20(Agenda%20item%2010)%20(Secretariat).pdf

[10] UNCLOS Art. 105 and 107.

[11] UNCLOS Art. 2.

[12] See https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1342-new-imb-report-reveals-concerning-rise-in-maritime-piracy-incidents-in-2023

[13] See generally, https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/Piracy-Reports-Default.aspx. Data for January 2024 is from the IMO’s Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS).

[14] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-68091830

[15] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67731853.amp

[16] See Report of the UN Secretary General on The Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia. https://unsos.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_somalia_3_november_2021_.pdf

[17] See Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, 725 F.3d 940, US Court of Appeals (9th circuit 2013). Pg. 7-8 of decision. https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/05/24/12-35266.pdf

[18] See The Republic of Seychelles v. Abdukar Ahmed & 5 others, Supreme Court of Seychelles, Case No. 21 of 2011. Para.2.  https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/case-law-doc/piracycrimetype/syc/2011/the_republic_vs._abdukar_ahmed_five_5_others.html

[19] See https://unsos.unmissions.org/about

[20] See https://atmis-au.org/about-atmis/

[21] See part 5 of UN Doc S/Res/2687 (2023) http://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2687(2023)

[22] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:315:0037:0043:EN:PDF

[23] See https://www.yara.com/knowledge-grows/game-changer-for-the-environment/

[24] See https://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2023/english/chp6.pdf

[25] Ibid.

[26] For instance, The Djibouti Code of Conduct on the repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea, is a cooperation agreement between 20 states in the Western Indian Ocean region. See https://dcoc.org/about-us/. It is supported by the EU, see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02008E0851-20221212.

The Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum have declared their cooperation against piracy and other threats to security. See https://asean.org/arf-statement-on-cooperation-against-piracy-and-other-threats-to-security/. See also https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Chairmans-Statement-of-30th-ARF-2023-FINAL-1.pdf

Submarine/Undersea Cables: An Overview

One Infrastructure Many Uses

Submarine/Undersea cables are often overlooked elements of our connected world of computers, digital networks and users. Over 95% of international internet, data and telephone traffic are carried by submarine cables.[1]  Submarine cables are vital to ensuring a thriving global economy as they can transmit vast amounts of data with very little delay, have minimal impact on the marine environment and once lain, have a low-carbon footprint.[2] With the continued growth in the amount of data and information sent and received worldwide, economies depend on the effective governance of this vital infrastructure.[3]  

Submarine fibre-optic cables can also be used to study the seabed and provide data that could help us address environmental threats due to climate change. With this data, states could improve climate monitoring systems and early warning protocols for natural disasters thereby encouraging timely and targeted emergency response and disaster preparedness.[4] Our ocean floor is a vital source of information regarding tectonic movement so a global network of cables could be used to further monitor and provide real time data about the movement, structure and dynamic behaviour of our Earth’s tectonic activity.[5]

The submarine cable industry is well positioned for a multi-sectoral governance framework that addresses security and environmental challenges in our world.

The Joint Task Force (JTF) on Science Monitoring and Resilient Telecommunication (SMART) cable systems, set up in 2012 by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IOC-UNESCO), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has taken a multi-sectoral approach towards advocating for developing and marketing dual-use or SMART cables that can deliver data on climate and sea-level rises and improve disaster warning systems.[6]

The Legal Framework

Specific provisions regarding the laying of submarine cables and liability in the event of damage are governed by the 1884 International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables as amended by the 1886 Declaration on the Protection of Submarine Cables and 1887 Protocol on the Protection of Submarine Cables. Although these treaties are still in force, they are outdated, regulatorily sparse and do not provide a modern and proactive level of protection needed for submarine cables. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that the laying of submarine cables on the continental shelf (the seabed and subsoil beyond the territorial sea) is an internationally lawful use of the sea by all states whether landlocked or coastal. 

Ensuring Seamless and Secure Flows 

According to a recent study by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) at the end of 2019, 53.6% of the global population were using the internet. Europe has the highest internet usage rate in the world with over 82% of its inhabitants using the internet.[7] Therefore it is important that there are well regulated guidelines for protection of submarine cables. The vulnerability of submarine cables was demonstrated by recent reports from Dublin port about foreign intelligence agents inspecting the cables that connect Europe to America.[8]

In January 2020, the West African Cable System which links Europe, West Africa and South Africa was damaged at two points leading to communications difficulties and slow data speed.[9] With route diversity and alternative routes as a backup, the severity of the impact was minimised, and complete outages were avoided. Presumably, lessons were learned from the 2018 outage when the Africa to Europe submarine cable, which starts from France ending at South Africa, was damaged causing communications breakdown in many African states.[10]

As an infrastructure with global reach, it is important that global guidelines clarifying best practice are in place.

The International Cables Protection Committee (ICPC)[11] is a forum through which cable operators and owners can collaborate to agree arrangements on issues concerning cable protection. It does not hold power to enforce legally binding international agreements or apply sanctions for non-compliance. However, it could engender soft law commitments that would be translated into action at national and stakeholder level.  

Cables and Our Environment

The geographic configuration of internet communications determines the content and quality of our internet experience and its efficacy depends on the connectivity of the data relative to the data consumers. Establishing general protective mechanisms is the next step towards mitigating risk to offshore and nearshore cables. This is possible through awareness of the benefits of multi-use submarine cables usage alongside national and global efforts by states, cable owners and operators to further engage with the ICPC towards cable security and reliability for societal benefit. 


[1] Carter L., Burnett D., Drew S., Marle G., Hagadorn L., Bartlett-McNeil D., and Irvine N. (2009). Submarine Cables and the Oceans – Connecting the World. UNEP-WCMC Biodiversity Series No. 31. ICPC/UNEP/UNEP-WCMC.  Available at https://www.unep-wcmc.org/resources-and-data/submarine-cables-and-the-oceans--connecting-the-world

[2] UN doc. A/70/74 of 30 March 2015  https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/093/76/PDF/N1509376.pdf?OpenElement

[3] For figures on this growth broken down per continent, see https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx

[4] Illuminating seafloor faults and ocean dynamics with dark fiber distributed acoustic sensing
Nathaniel J. Lindsey, T. Craig Dawe, Jonathan B. Ajo-Franklin, Science 29 Nov 2019: Vol. 366, Issue 6469, pp. 1103-1107. 

[5] Illuminating Earth’s Faults by Phillippe Jousset Science 29 November 2019: Vol.366, Issue 6469, pp. 1076-1077. 

[6] https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/climatechange/task-force-sc/Pages/default.aspx The JTF is also considering the renovation and relocation of retired or disused cables in our seas.

[7] https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx

[8] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-agents-plunge-to-new-ocean-depths-in-ireland-to-crack-transatlantic-cables-fnqsmgncz?wgu=270525_54264_15826410289355_49fb461bc4&wgexpiry=1590417028&utm_source=planit&utm_medium=affiliate&utm_content=22278

[9]  https://guardian.ng/news/confusion-as-submarine-cable-cuts-slows-internet/ and 

https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/internet/undersea-cable-repairs-south-africa

[10] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mauritiana-internet-cut-underwater-cable-offline-days-west-africa-a8298551.html

[11] https://www.iscpc.org The ICPC has more than 170 members in over 65 states.

The Draft Agreement for the Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Are We There Yet?

The draft Agreement under the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity (MBD) of areas beyond national jurisdiction is now available to facilitate the negotiation of the final Agreement.[1] Marine biological diversity is the diverse systems of genes, species and ecosystems in the marine environment[2] and is found in approx. 64% of the world’s oceans which lies beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.[3]  

Marine resources can traverse different jurisdictions during their life cycles and marine ecosystems are not neatly distributed within national boundaries, therefore it is imperative that sustainable management discourse is framed multi-jurisdictionally

UNCLOS does not specifically address sustainability and MBD although Article 192 of UNCLOS provides for the protection of the marine environment and Article 194 enjoins states to protect rare and fragile ecosystems. UNCLOS was of its time and when drafted, negotiating states’ attention was focused on defining the limits of states’ entitlements off their coasts and the regulation of rights and obligations applicable thereto. 

Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction in UNCLOS and Beyond: Mind the Gap

Transboundary agreements and agreements governing areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are not novel. Indeed, UNCLOS established the Common Heritage regime for mineral resources recovered on or beneath the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.[4] With regard to fisheries, the 2012 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Resources in the South Pacific Ocean fills a crucial gap in the conservation and management of fisheries beyond areas of national jurisdiction but is restricted to a section of the Pacific Ocean.[5] Focusing on biodiversity, the 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) complements UNCLOS albeit with jurisdictional limitations; it applies to biological diversity within national jurisdiction.[6]

Governance frameworks over areas beyond national jurisdiction should form part of a longer-term goal of continually addressing regulatory gaps in the conservation and sustainable use of areas beyond national jurisdiction. This is in keeping with Article 197 of UNCLOS which provides that states should co-operate on a global basis in agreeing international rules for the protection of the marine environment.

The Benefit of Co-operation on a Global Basis

The UN General Assembly, as the forum for the development and codification of International Law through its resolutions[7] in accordance with UNCLOS can, according to Abott and Snidal’s view in relation to the role of international organisations, enhance efficiency further producing political effects such as shaping understandings and elaborating norms.[8]

This is indicative of the zeitgeist; state autonomy in relation to sustainable management of resources is reinvented as states are desirous of ensuring that emerging laws over our marine resources are rooted in sustainability principles

Staying the Sustainable Course 

A comprehensive institutional framework is foundational to sustainability. Therefore, time will tell if agreed institutional arrangements namely, the Conference of the Parties, would address any arguable lack of coordination, collaboration and exchange of information between related institutions and state parties.[9] Specifically, the ball would be in state parties’ courts to ensure the following:  

  • The development and transfer of technology particularly in the realm of marine science towards global baseline data to support further understanding of the marine ecosystem;

  • The promotion of capacity-building; and

  • Regional co-operation and co-ordination between state actors and scientific observers to develop spatial approaches to ocean use and management.  

[1] https://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.232/2019/6 and https://www.un.org/bbnj/sites/www.un.org.bbnj/files/draft_text_a.conf_.232.2019.6_advanced_unedited_version_corr.pdf.

[2] Centre for Marine Conservation and others, ‘Marine Biological Diversity: Definition and Importance’ in Norse, Elliott. A (ed), Global Marine Biological Diversity: A Strategy for Building Conservation Into Decision Making (Island Press, Washington 1993 USA).

[3] Collins, J. (2019) Report of the Workshop “Marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction: bridging policy, law, science and research and development” 21-22 May 2019, Brussels.10. 

[4] UNCLOS Article 133. This maritime zone beyond national jurisdiction is known as the Area. 

UNCLOS also established the institution framework for the common heritage regime. The International Seabed Authority.

[5] http://www.fao.org/fishery/docs/DOCUMENT/sprfmo/legal/SPRFMOConvention.pdf.

[6] The Nagoya Protocol of the CBD was set up to regulate the exploitation of genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits of the same. 

[7] See General Assembly Resolutions 69/292 and 72/249.

[8] Abbott, Kenneth. W & Snidal, Duncan, Why States Act through Formal International Organisations, 42 The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1998) 9.

[9] Romero Lares Maria C, Some Considerations about the Shortcomings of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a Contribution to the Sustainable Governance of the Oceans, 11 Anuario Colombiano de Derecho Internacional 131 (2018) 153. 


Fisheries Partnership Agreements in 2019: Sustainably Maximising Returns for Fisheries?

Fisheries Agreements are beneficial

Fisheries agreements operate to ensure that states economically benefit from their own fishing industries. This is legally possible because the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention in concomitance with the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement ensured that states gained sovereign rights for exploiting and managing their natural resources off their coasts up to 200 nautical miles.

Big Market Wide Reach

The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) states in its leading document that monitors the state of the world’s fisheries and aquaculture, that based on catch weight, the EU is the largest single market of the worlds import of fish and fish products.[1] The same report notes that in Africa, marine catches in its main fishing areas continue to grow and the firm connection of African fisheries with its ocean communities highlights the importance of fisheries in terms of value and employment.[2]

The EU is best placed to affect change and support its fisheries partners in fully realising the potential contributions of their fisheries to the growth of their economies.

A New Protocol between the EU and Senegal 

On 24 July 2019, the EU announced its signing of a sustainable fishing partnership agreement Protocol with Senegal.[3] This new Protocol, which is not yet in force, implements the 2014 Fisheries agreement between the EU and Senegal; a multi-species agreement which sets out the conditions whereby EU fishing vessels may sustainably fish in Senegalese waters. 

The new Protocol, in superseding the current Protocol (due to expire November 2019) takes into account best available scientific advice, a stakeholders’ consultation and the recommendations of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). In exchange for fishing rights, the EU will pay Senegal €1,700,000 p.a. and part of this will be reserved for sustainable fisheries management in Senegal. By tackling illegal, unrecorded and unreported (IUU) fishing, the value of Senegalese fisheries would be increased. In addition to this annual financial contribution, ship owners would be required to contribute approx. €1,350,000 yearly to Senegal. 

The Fleet and Issues of Sustainability

The new Protocol specifies a maximum of 28 tuna seiners. In comparison with the current Protocol, the new Protocol increases the provisions for pole-and-line vessels. It also introduces provisions for long liner vessels whilst retaining the current Protocol’s provisions for trawlers for demersal species such as hake. 

Based on the press document, it is currently unclear how the retention of the current Protocol’s provision for trawlers for demersal species would achieve the EU’s goal of lowering the total allowable catch for hake. So, I will update my readers when the new Protocol enters into force and is made available for scholarly analysis.

Agreements should recognise that sustainable maximisation of economic returns is a continually evolving relationship between economic productivity and ready availability.

Sustainability as a Process: Some Questions

As the EU seeks to engage with host states in negotiating sustainable fisheries agreements and/or implementing Protocols, these are some of the questions it must continually address:

  •  Is there measurable and traceable evidence of the incorporation of scientific advice in these agreements? 

  • What stock-wide management arrangements are in place?

  •  How may the EU contribute to increasing the management capacity of the host state particularly in developing economies’ artisanal sector through the viability of the local fishing communities?  

  • How may the EU assist or reinforce Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) activities in the host state?

Any focus on ready availability of resource should regularly assess and take into account emerging issues affecting the parties’ economic, human, national and institutional sectors.

[1]FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department.2018) 56.

[2]Ibid. 

[3]https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/press/eu-signs-sustainable-fishing-partnership-agreement-protocol-senegal_en